*•  I 


A  TRUE  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


BY 
THOMAS  G.  FROTHINGHAM 

CAPTAIN,  U.  S.  R. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 


A  TRUE  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

MAY  31,  1916 


By 

THOMAS  G.  FROTHINGHAM 

CAPTAIN,  U.  S.  R. 


Author  of 

A  Guide  to  the  Military  History  of 

The  World  War 

1914-1918 


CAMBRIDGE,  MASSACHUSETTS 
BACON  #  BROWN 

1920 


COPYRIGHT,  BACON  $  BHOWN 


PREFACE 

THE  following  is  an  account  of  the  essential  facts 
of  the  Battle  of  Jutland,  amplified  from  the  review 
in  the  author's  book,  A  Guide  to  the  Military  His- 
tory of  The  World  War,  1914-1918,  published  this 
year  by  Little,  Brown  &  Co.  This  gives  a  greatly 
needed  description  of  the  events  of  the  naval  ac- 
tion, with  the  forces  of  both  sides  placed  in  true 
relation,  one  to  the  other. 

No  previously  published  account  had  contained 
an  adequate  treatment  of  the  manoeuvres  of  both 
fleets,  as  certain  important  events  of  the  action 
were  not  understood,  and  it  had  been  assumed  that 
situations  existed  for  which  there  was  no  founda- 
tion in  fact.  All  this  has  resulted  in  a  mass  of  con- 
fused and  erroneous  narratives  —  and  the  Battle 
of  Jutland  has  become  one  of  the  most  misunder- 
stood actions  in  history. 

The  British  Admiralty  has  announced  that  an 
official  record  of  the  Battle  of  Jutland  would  not 
be  given  out.  Instead  of  this,  the  official  dis- 
patches covering  the  action  have  been  issued  in  the 
form  of  a  Blue-book.  The  publication  of  these 
documents  does  not  help  to  solve  many  vexed 


vi  PREFACE 

questions  —  and  the  need  is  all  the  more  evident 
of  a  trustworthy  account  of  the  action. 

The  reader  may  feel  sure  that  the  real  course  of 
the  great  naval  battle  has  been  traced  in  the  present 
version,  and  that  the  facts  here  given  have  been 
established  beyond  dispute.  In  this  way  a  reliable 
basis  has  been  provided  for  reading  narratives  of 
the  action,  for  studying  the  details  of  its  varying 
fortunes  —  and  for  correcting  many  erroneous  im- 
pressions which  have  been  current. 

A  portion  of  the  text  was  published  in  the  Boston 
Evening  Transcript  of  October  9,  1920.  Two  of 
the  charts  have  been  reproduced  from  A  Guide  to 
the  Military  History  of  The  World  War,  and  the 
thanks  of  the  author  are  given  to  Messrs.  Little, 
Brown  &  Co.  for  their  courtesy  in  allowing  use  of 
the  text  of  the  book. 


LIST  OF  TABLES 

Table  I.      The  British  Grand  Fleet  at  the  Battle  of 

Jutland 6 

Table  II.    The  German  High  Seas  Fleet  at  the  Battle 

of  Jutland 7 

LIST  OF  CHARTS 

Chart  showing  the  Battle  of  Jutland,  in  relation  to 

the  surroundings  on  the  North  Sea 9 

Chart  No.  1.      Typical  British  Chart,   of  the  later 

manoeuvres  of  the  action  which  are  in  dispute        .          81 

Chart  No.  2.      The  Battle  of  Jutland     .      .      facing          54 

Chart  No.  2  is  BO  placed  that  it  can  be  opened 
outside  the  pages  for  use  as  the  text  is  being  read. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

MAY  31,  1916 

Authorities  quoted  in  the  text  are  indicated  as  follows: 
Admiral  Jellicoe  (J),  Vice  Admiral  Beatty  (B),  Admiral  Scheer  (S). 

THE  Battle  of  Jutland  has  been  made  a  matter 
of  bitter  controversy,  and  accounts  of  the  ac- 
tion have  been  so  molded  to  fit  partisan  theories 
that  the  actual  events  have  become  obscured.  Yet 
these  events  can  now  be  determined  through  means 
that  were  never  before  available  in  the  case  of  a 
great  naval  battle.  Both  commanders  have  pub- 
lished their  detailed  accounts,  and  there  is  no  longer 
any  reason  for  uncertainty  as  to  the  essentials  of 
the  action.  Many  of  the  tales  from  Germany  were 
obviously  untrue,  but  Admiral  Scheer,  the  German 
Commander-in-Chief,  has  given  a  straightforward 
story  of  the  battle  which  supplements  the  version 
of  Admiral  Jellicoe,  the  British  Commander-in- 
Chief. 

When  the  wide  field  of  operations  is  taken  into 
account,  the  two  narratives  of  the  rival  command- 
ers agree  to  a  surprising  extent  as  to  the  events  of 
the  early  stages  of  the  action.  The  engagement 
between  the  two  advanced  forces,  the  advent  of 
the  German  High  Seas  Fleet,  and  the  running  fight 


2  THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

to  meet  the  British  Grand  Fleet,  are  related  in  con- 
firmation of  Lord  Jellicoe's  report,  and  of  the  ac- 
count in  his  book.  Concerning  the  events  of  these 
first  phases  of  the  battle  the  various  British  narra- 
tives also  practically  agree. 

Most  of  the  differences  and  controversies  relate 
to  the  ensuing  stages.  Concerning  these  events  of 
the  latter  part  of  the  action  Admiral  Scheer  sup- 
plies much  needed  data,  throwing  new  light  upon 
manoeuvres  which  had  not  been  understood  by  the 
British  —  and  no  narrative  has  yet  been  published 
which  covers  this  ground. 

To  understand  the  battle,  it  is  necessary  to 
remember  that  it  had  become  the  custom  of  the 
British  fleet  to  leave  its  safeguarded  bases  in  the 
north  of  the  British  Isles  and  make  periodical 
sweeps  through  the  North  Sea.  The  Admiralty 
had  ordered  the  Grand  Fleet  to  begin  such  a  sweep 
on  May  30. x  At  the  beginning  of  his  Report  of  the 
battle  Admiral  Jellicoe  thus  describes  the  situa- 
tion: 

"The  Ships  of  the  Grand  Fleet,  in  pursuance  of 
the  general  policy  of  periodical  sweeps  through  the 
North  Sea,  had  left  its  base  on  the  previous  day  in 

1  "In  accordance  with  instructions  contained  in  their  Lordship's 
telegram,  No.  434,  of  30th  May,  code  time  1740,  the  Grand  Fleet 
proceeded  to  sea  on  30th  May,  1916."  (J) 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  3 

accordance  with  instructions  issued  by  me.  In  the 
early  afternoon  of  Wednesday,  May  31,  the  1st  and 
2nd  Battle  Cruiser  Squadrons,  the  1st,  2nd,  and 
3rd  Light  Cruiser  Squadrons,  and  destroyers  from 
the  1st,  9th,  and  13th  Flotillas,  supported  by  the 
Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  were,  in  accordance  with 
my  directions,  scouting  to  the  southward  of  the 
Battle  Fleet."  (J) 

On  May  31  the  German  High  Seas  Fleet  was  also 
on  the  North  Sea.  There  had  been  an  insistent 
demand  from  the  German  people  for  activity  on 
the  part  of  the  battle  fleet.  In  response,  the  new 
Commander-in-Chief,  Admiral  Scheer,  had  taken 
his  battleships  to  sea  at  times.  This  change  of 
tactics  was  a  demonstration  deliberately  planned 
for  effect  in  Germany,  but  Admiral  Scheer  had 
taken  great  pains  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  his 
command,  and  on  that  day  he  had  with  him  all  the 
strength  he  could  muster,  even  including  the  avail- 
able predreadnoughts.  He  was  thus  prepared  to 
fight,  if  he  could  manoeuvre  to  engage  the  British 
fleet  in  part  or  under  conditions  advantageous  for 
the  Germans.  This  sortie  of  May  31  brought  on 
the  Battle  of  Jutland. 

For  some  time  after  the  action  there  were  tales 
of  other  objectives,  —  to  cover  the  escape  of  raid- 
ers, to  get  ships  out  of  the  Baltic,  etc.  Even  Lord 


4  THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

Jellicoe  indulged  in  theories  as  to  the  object  of  the 
German  sortie  and  the  movements  that  led  to  the 
engagement.  This  question  has  been  ended  by 
Admiral  Scheer's  account  of  his  definite  order  of 
May  18,  1916,  for  a  raid  on  the  east  coast  of  Eng- 
land at  Sunderland,  including  the  dispositions  of 
U-boats.  Such  a  raid  "would  be  certain  to  call 
out  a  display  of  English  fighting  forces  as  promised 
by  Mr.  Balfour."  (S)  After  a  delay  on  account  of 
bad  weather,  this  plan  was  modified  in  the  opera- 
tion of  May  31,  off  the  Skagerrak  —  and  it  was 
carried  out  with  the  hope,  frankly  expressed  by 
the  German  Admiral,  that  his  enemy  "would  af- 
ford us  an  opportunity  to  engage  part  or  the 
whole  of  his  fleet  in  battle  under  conditions  favor- 
able to  ourselves."  (S)  This  situation  tended  to 
bring  on  a  naval  action,  especially  as  the  Admiralty 
telegram  gave  the  intimation  that  German  naval 
forces  would  be  out. 

The  opposing  fleets  in  the  Battle  of  Jutland  were 
as  follows: 

1.  An  advance  British  force  under  Vice  Admiral 
Beatty,  consisting  of  six  battle  cruisers  (four  Lions 
of  28  knots  speed,  each  carrying  eight  13.5-inch 
guns,  and  two  Indefatigables  of  25  knots  speed, 
each  carrying  eight  12-inch  guns),  supported  by 
the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  under  Rear  Admiral 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  5 

Evan-Thomas  (four  25 -knot  battleships  of  the 
Queen  Elizabeth  class,  each  carrying  eight  15-inch 
guns,  Barham  (F),  Valiant,  Malaya,  Warspite). 

The  fleet  speed  of  this  advance  force  was  25 
knots. 

2.  The  main  body  of  the  British  Grand  Fleet, 
under  Admiral  Jellicoe,  flying  his  flag  in  the  Iron 
Duke,  consisting  of  a  fast  wing  under  Rear  Admiral 
Hood  (three  26-knot  battle  cruisers  of  Invincible 
class,  each  carrying  eight  12-inch  guns),  a  division 
of  four    armored    cruisers    under  Rear  Admiral 
Arbuthnot,  and  twenty -four  dreadnoughts  in  three 
squadrons  commanded  by  Vice  Admirals  Burney, 
Jerram,  and  Sturdee. 

The  fleet  speed  of  this  main  body  was  20  knots^ 
and  its  formidable  armament  will  be  found  in 
Table  I. 

3.  Twenty -five  light  cruisers,  and  seventy-eight 
destroyers,   "47  with  the  Battle  Fleet,  31  with 
Battle  Cruisers."  (J) 

The  German  strength  comprised: 

1.  An  advance  force  under  Vice  Admiral  Hipper, 
consisting  of  five  battle  cruisers  (three  Derfflingers 
of  28  knots  speed,  each  carrying  eight  12-inch 
guns,  and  two  Molikes  of  27  knots  speed,  each 
carrying  ten  11-inch  guns). 

The  fleet  speed  of  this  advance  force  was  27  knots. 


THE   BATTLE   OF  JUTLAND 


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THE  BATTLE   OF  JUTLAND 


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8  THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

2.  The  main  body  of  the  German  High  Seas 
Fleet,  under  Admiral  Scheer,  consisting  of  sixteen 
dreadnoughts  ["Konig  Albert  absent"  (S)]  and  six 
predreadnought  battleships. 

The  fleet  speed  of  this  main  body  was  17  knots, 
because  the  German  dreadnoughts  had  been  eked 
out  with  predreadnought  battleships  of  less  speed. 
Its  less  powerful  armament  will  be  found  in  Table  II. 

3.  Eleven  light  cruisers  and  about  seventy -eight 
destroyers,  divided  between  the  advance  force  and 
the  main  body.     (Admiral  Jellicoe  gives  the  Ger- 
mans eighty-eight  destroyers,  but  it  is  known  that 
all  were  not  in  action.) 

The  above-described  make-up  of  the  opposing 
fleets  must  be  kept  in  mind,  when  studying  the 
course  of  the  action.  The  day  of  the  battle  was 
cloudy,  but  the  sun  shone  through  the  clouds  most 
of  the  time.  At  no  time  was  there  anything  ap- 
proaching a  sea.  Visibility  was  reported  as  good 
in  the  first  stages  of  the  action,  but  later  in  the 
afternoon,  there  being  little  wind,  mist  and  smoke 
hung  heavy  over  the  surface  of  the  sea.  These 
conditions  must  also  be  remembered,  as  the  in- 
creasing mist  had  a  great  influence  on  the  course 
of  the  action. 

The  following  outline  will  bring  the  action  to 
the  stage  at  which  detailed  comment  should  begin. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND  9 

o         £ ice 


From  y4  Guide  to  the  Military  History  of  The  World  War,  1914-1918. 


Chart  showing  the  Battle  of  Jutland,  in  relation  to  the  surroundings 
on  the  North  Sea.  (1)  The  Battle  Field,  May  31,  1916.  (2)  Position 
of  British  Fleet  "at  about  2.47  A.M.,"  (J)  June  1,  1916.  (This  chart 
is  diagrammatic  only.  ) 

In  the  sweep  through  the  North  Sea,  with  the 
main  body  of  the  British  Grand  Fleet  some  seventy 
miles  distant,  Vice  Admiral  Beatty's  advance  force 
was  cruising  to  southward  of  Admiral  Jellicoe  May 
31,  1916,  when,  at  2.20  P.M.,  the  presence  of  enemy 
ships  was  reported  by  a  light  cruiser.  Admiral 


10          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

Beatty  altered  course  "to  the  eastward  and  sub- 
sequently to  northeastward,  the  enemy  being 
sighted  at  3.31  P.M.  Their  force  consisted  of  five 
battle  cruisers."  (B)  This  was  the  German  ad- 
vance under  Vice  Admiral  Hipper. 

It  is  stated  in  Vice  Admiral  Beatty 's  report  that 
it  was  over  an  hour  after  the  first  news  of  the 
vicinity  of  enemy  ships  before  he  increased  speed 
to  25  knots  to  engage,  "at  3.30  P.M."  (B)  Yet 
Vice  Admiral  Beatty  reports  that  Rear  Admiral 
Evan-Thomas's  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  (the  four 
Queen  Elizabeths)  was  still  10,000  yards  away  when 
he  made  this  move  to  engage  the  Germans  with  his 
battle  cruisers.  Consequently  Vice  Admiral  Beatty 
failed  to  impose  his  whole  strength  upon  his  en- 
emy's detached  force. 

It  is  hard  to  explain  this  situation  except  by 
believing  that  Vice  Admiral  Beatty  was  confident 
that  his  six  battle  cruisers  alone  would  be  able  to 
cope  with  the  enemy.  Allowing  his  force  to  re- 
main divided  by  such  an  interval  was  unfortunate, 
and  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  best  use  was  made 
of  the  British  advance  force  in  the  first  stage  of  the 
engagement. 

At  3.48  "the  action  commenced  at  a  range  of 
18,500  yards,  both  sides  opening  fire  practically 
simultaneously."  (B)  The  British  battle  cruisers 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND          11 

fought  on  a  course  curving  to  the  southeast,  and 
then  on  a  south-southeast  course,  and  the  five 
German  battle  cruisers  fought  them  on  a  parallel 
course,  instead  of  edging  away  from  the  superior 
British  force.  It  is  now  easy  to  see  that  the  trend 
of  the  action  was  absolutely  in  the  direction  of  the 
approaching  main  body  of  the  German  High  Seas 
Fleet,  but  this,  very  naturally,  was  not  apparent 
at  the  time  to  Vice  Admiral  Beatty. 

The  first  phase  of  the  battle  may  properly  be 
studied  as  a  fight  between  the  British  and  German 
battle  cruisers,  in  consequence  of  the  before-stated 
gap  separating  the  two  parts  of  Admiral  Beatty 's 
command.  This  interval  of  10,000  yards  pre- 
vented the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  of  Queen  Eliza- 
beth dreadnoughts  from  being  a  factor  at  the  time. 
Vice  Admiral  Beatty  reports  that  this  squadron 
"opened  fire  at  a  range  of  20,000  yards,"  and  he 
continues:  "The  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  was  en- 
gaging the  enemy's  rear  ships,  unfortunately  at 
very  long  range."  Only  two  of  the  German  ships 
were  really  under  fire  from  the  Fifth  Battle  Squa- 
dron, and  these  two  battle  cruisers  were  but  slightly 
injured  in  the  run  to  the  south. 

In  this  part  of  the  action  came  the  first  of  the 
many  upsets  of  prewar  calculations.  Comparing 
the  given  strength  of  the  two  opposing  squadrons 


12          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

in  action,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  British  battle 
cruisers  were  greatly  superior;  in  fact,  the  odds 
would  have  been  considered  prohibitive  before  this 
battle.  Yet  it  was  the  British  squadron  that  suf- 
fered, losing  one-third  of  its  ships.  "At  about  4.06  " 
(J)  the  Indefatigable  was  sunk,  and  "at  about  4.26" 
(J)  the  Queen  Mary  met  the  same  fate.  In  each  case 
there  was  a  great  explosion  up  through  the  turrets, 
suggesting  that  a  weak  turret  construction  is  really 
a  dangerous  conductor  of  fire  to  the  magazine  in 
case  of  a  heavy  hit,  and  pointing  to  the  need  of 
better  separation  of  the  supply  of  ammunition  from 
the  magazine. 

At  4.15  there  were  attacks  "simultaneously"  (B) 
by  British  and  German  destroyers  which  resulted 
in  a  lively  fight,  but  no  damage  to  any  of  the  capital 
ships.  Yet  the  possibilities  of  such  torpedo  attacks 
were  so  evident,  here  and  later  in  the  battle,  that 
the  destroyer  at  once  attained  a  greater  value  as 
an  auxiliary  of  the  battleship.  A  British  airplane 
had  been  sent  up  from  a  mother  ship  just  before 
the  engagement,  though  Admiral  Beatty  reports 
that  it  was  forced  to  fly  low  on  account  of  the 
clouds,  and  had  a  hard  task  "to  identify  four 
enemy  light  cruisers."  (B)  There  was  apparently 
no  chance  of  a  wide  observation  that  would  have 
warned  Admiral  Beatty  of  the  approaching  Ger- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND          13 

man  High  Seas  Fleet.     In  this  short  hour  were 
concentrated  many  new  problems  of  naval  warfare. 

The  advancing  German  High  Seas  Fleet  was  re- 
ported at  4.38  by  a  light  cruiser,  the  Southampton, 
and  sighted  at  4.42  by  the  British  battle  cruisers. 
A  few  minutes  later  Vice  Admiral  Beatty's  ships 
turned  right  about  (180  degrees)  in  succession. 
The  German  battle  cruisers  also  turned  to  a  north- 
westerly course. 

One  great  advantage  was  gained  for  the  British 
in  this  manoeuvre.  By  the  turn  in  succession  the 
four  Queen  Elizabeth  battleships,  the  Fifth  Battle 
Squadron,  were  brought  into  position  to  fight  a 
rearguard  action  against  the  greatly  strengthened 
force  of  the  enemy.  The  leading  German  battle- 
ships, which  were  of  the  Konig  class,  fell  into  line, 
closely  following  Admiral  Hipper's  battle  cruisers, 
and  the  battle  was  continued  at  14,000  yards  on  a 
northwest  course. 

In  the  meantime,  from  the  north,  the  British 
Grand  Fleet  had  been  closing  at  utmost  fleet  speed 
on  south  and  southeast  by  south  courses,  disposed 
in  six  divisions,  numbered  from  port  to  starboard, 
on  parallel  courses  as  shown  in  Table  I.  Admiral 
Jellicoe  had  received  no  certain  information  from 
Vice  Admiral  Beatty  as  to  the  positions  of  the  en- 
gaged ships,  and  he  had  been  proceeding  in  the 


14          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

general  direction  of  the  running  fight,  instead  of 
having  in  mind  any  definite  point  for  joining  forces 
with  Vice  Admiral  Beatty.  It  must  also  be  real- 
ized that  conditions  of  increasing  mist  and  inter- 
mittent fog,  which  rendered  observation  very  un- 
certain, had  become  prevalent. 


It  is  from  this  stage  of  the  action  that  the  tactics 
of  the  battle  have  become  involved  in  controversy 

—  and  a  new  account  of  the  ensuing  events  of  the 
battle  is  greatly  needed. 

In  the  first  place,  it  should  be  stated  that  a  broad 
tactical  situation  existed  that  was  almost  beyond 
the  hopes  of  the  British.  This  was  irrespective  of 
any  moves  of  the  British  Commander-in-Chief,  or 
of  the  Commander  of  the  British  advance  force. 
By  its  own  act  the  weaker  German  fleet  was  out  in 
the  North  Sea,  committed  to  an  enterprise  which 
had  taken  it  away  from  its  bases.  Not  only  that 

—  but,  by  bringing  out  the  squadron  of  predread- 
noughts,  Admiral  Scheer's  fleet  speed  was  reduced 
to  17  knots.     Casting  aside  all  details  of  tactics, 
this  constituted  the  established  condition  that  the 
weaker  fleet  of  inferior  speed  had  offered  the  op- 
portunity to  the  British   fleet  —  and   evasion  by 
flight  alone  was  impossible.     Looked  at  in  this 
light,  it  was  a  better  chance  than  could  ever  have 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND          15 

been  expected.  Yet  a  combination  of  circum- 
stances, including  weather  conditions,  tactics,  and 
methods,  prevented  a  decision,  where  such  a  result 
seemed  to  be  insured. 

This  is  the  underlying  tragedy  of  Jutland  —  and 
this  is  why  all  the  accounts  have  to  deal  with  ex- 
planations and  justifications. 

One  very  unfavorable  situation  was  being  de- 
veloped at  this  stage,  at  the  time  when  the  British 
advance  force  was  seeking  a  junction  with  the 
Grand  Fleet.  As  has  been  said,  Lord  Jellicoe  was 
not  receiving  information  that  would  enable  him 
to  join  forces  effectively  with  Vice  Admiral  Beatty. 
The  original  disposition  of  the  British  naval 
strength,  with  the  advance  force  flung  ahead  of 
the  Grand  Fleet,  was  sound,  if  there  were  tactical 
coordination  between  the  separated  parts.  It  is 
impossible  to  say  that  this  existed,  and  the  im- 
perfect information  given  by  Vice  Admiral  Beatty 
to  the  Commander-in-Chief  is  a  notable  feature  of 
the  battle. 

With  all  due  allowance  for  interference  and  dam- 
age to  the  wireless,  especially  on  the  Lion,  it  is 
hard  to  see  why  Lord  Jellicoe  should  have  been  so 
badly  informed  as  ,to  the  positions  of  the  ships 
engaged,  and  why  definite  information  should  have 
been  so  long  delayed.  In  this  important  phase  of 


16          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

the  tactics  of  the  battle  we  are  forced  to  the  con- 
clusion that  all  means  had  not  been  taken  to  insure 
the  coordination  of  the  British  advance  force  and 
the  Grand  Fleet  through  linking  up  ships  and  other 
methods. 

This  disposition  of  the  British  forces  had  often 
been  used,  and  the  logical  aim  of  the  sweep  of  the 
North  Sea  was  to  find  and  engage  the  enemy.  Yet, 
when  the  enemy  actually  was  found,  it  became 
evident  that  methods  had  not  been  developed  for 
using  the  whole  British  force  as  parts  of  one  great 
t  manoeuvre.  With  the  uncertain  information  that 
Admiral  Jellicoe  possessed  as  to  what  was  going 
on,  any  such  joint  manoeuvre  could  only  have 
taken  place  through  a  miracle  of  luck.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  there  was  an  error  of  twelve  miles  to  the 
eastward  in  location. 


After  the  turn  to  the  north,  in  the  running  fight 
in  pursuit  of  Vice  Admiral  Beatty's  force,  the  Ger- 
man fleet  was  approaching  the  British  Grand  Fleet, 
which  drew  near  in  the  increasing  mist.  To  under- 
stand the  course  of  the  action  at  this  critical  stage, 
the  reader  should  realize  that  the  Germans  pos- 
sessed a  fleet  manoeuvre  which  had  been  carefully 
rehearsed  for  such  a  contingency,  in  sudden  con- 
tact with  a  superior  enemy  force.  This  was  a 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND          17 

simultaneous  "swing-around"  (S)  of  all  the  ships 
of  the  fleet,  to  turn  the  line  and  bring  it  into  an 
opposite  course.  Admiral  Scheer  emphasizes  the 
pains  that  had  been  taken  to  develop  the  ability 
to  carry  out  this  manoeuvre,  which  had  before  been 
considered  impracticable  for  a  fleet  in  action.  "At 
our  peace  manoeuvres  great  importance  was  always 
attached  to  their  being  carried  out  on  a  curved  line 
and  every  means  employed  to  ensure  the  working 
of  the  signals."  (S)  He  is  certainly  justified  in 
adding  the  statement  that  "the  trouble  spent  was 
now  well  repaid,"  as  the  German  Admiral  was  by 
this  means  enabled  to  carry  out  an  unexpected  and 
very  effective  manoeuvre  on  two  occasions  when 
his  fleet  would  have  been  in  cramped  positions 
without  this  recourse.  Admiral  Scheer  was  also 
able  to  use  this  identical  manoeuvre  in  an  attack. 

The  British  did  not  have  any  idea  that  the  Ger- 
man Command  would  be  able  to  carry  out  this 
change  of  direction  of  the  German  line.  Conse- 
quently, in  the  smoke  and  mist,  these  thrice-exe- 
cuted movements  were  not  suspected  by  the  Brit- 
ish. With  such  an  important  part  of  the  German 
tactics  unnoticed,  and  not  taken  into  account  in 
relation  to  the  British  movements,  the  reasons  are 
evident  that  make  necessary  a  new  story  of  these 
phases  of  the  action. 


18          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

At  this  stage  of  the  running  fight,  the  British 
battle  cruisers,  on  a  northwesterly  course,  had 
drawn  ahead.  The  four  Queen  Elizabeth  battle- 
ships of  Evan-Thomas's  Fifth  Battle  Squadron 
were  following  them  and  "thereby  played  the 
part  of  cover  for  the  badly  damaged  cruisers."  (S) 
The  fight  had  "developed  into  a  stern  chase,"  (S) 
with  Hipper's  battle  cruisers  engaging  the  British 
battle  cruisers,  and  the  German  Main  Fleet  press- 
ing on  in  chase  of  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron. 
The  German  fleet  was  disposed  in  this  order: 
Squadron  III,  Squadron  I,  Squadron  II,  (pre- 
dreadnoughts).1 

Squadrons  III  and  I  had  opened  fire  at  4.45,  but 
although  they  showed  "speed  much  in  excess  of 
that  for  which  they  were  designed,"  (J)  the  Ger- 
man battleships  were  gradually  falling  behind  the 
fast  British  ships.  Admiral  Beatty's  cruisers  had 
drawn  clear  and  shortly  after  5.00  were  free  from 
the  fire  of  Hipper's  battle  cruisers.  His  increase 
to  full  speed  enabled  Vice  Admiral  Beatty  to  draw 
ahead.  He  again  opened  up  a  gap  between  his 
battle  cruisers  and  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  tak- 
ing a  course  that  curved  to  the  north  and  north- 
east, in  search  of  Admiral  Jellicoe's  battle  fleet, 
which  was  hastening  to  his  assistance. 
1  See  Table  II. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND          19 

The  ships  of  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  were  also 
drawing  away  from  the  German  battleships  and 
were  soon  only  under  fire  from  the  German  battle 
cruisers  and  the  leading  division  of  Squadron  III. 
As  the  British  battleships  continued  to  distance 
their  pursuers,  and  the  fire  even  of  this  leading 
German  division  grew  ineffective,  Admiral  Scheer 
at  5.20  signaled  to  Vice  Admiral  Hipper  "to  give 
chase."  Hipper  had  already  been  outdistanced 
by  the  British  battle  cruisers.  He  was  "forced,  in 
order  not  to  lose  touch,  to  follow  on  the  inner 
circle  and  adopt  the  enemy's  course."  (S)  As 
Beatty  swung  by  the  north  to  a  northeasterly  di- 
rection, Hipper  conformed  to  his  course.  At  this 
stage  the  weather  grew  hazy.  The  wind  changed 
from  northwest  to  southwest,  and  smoke  hung 
over  the  water. 

The  German  advance  was  soon  in  a  position 
where  it  could  not  engage  to  any  advantage  in  the 
mist  "with  the  sun  so  low  on  the  horizon."  (S) 
Hipper  was  also  in  danger  from  torpedo  attacks, 
and  at  5.40  the  German  Vice  Admiral  was  com- 
pelled to  turn  his  battle  cruisers  to  starboard,  "and 
finally  bring  the  unit  round  to  S.  W."  (S),  to  close 
up  with  the  German  battleships.  This  manoeuvre 
was  observed  in  the  mist  by  the  British,  but  not 
until  some  time  after  it  was  being  carried  out,  as 


20          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

Lord  Jellicoe  placed  it  "between  6  and  6.16."  (J) 
At  the  same  time  the  leading  German  battle-ships 
had  also  begun  to  veer  around  to  starboard,  to 
conform  with  the  course  of  the  British  advance, 
which  was  swinging  from  northeast  to  an  easterly 
direction.  Observing  this,  Admiral  Scheer  states 
that  at  5.45  the  order  "Leaders  in  Front"  was 
signaled,  "and  the  speed  temporarily  reduced  to 
fifteen  knots  to  make  it  possible  for  the  divisions 
ahead,  which  had  pushed  on  at  high  pressure,  to 
get  into  position  again."  (S)  By  this  means,  and 
through  the  early  closing  up  of  Hipper's  battle 
cruisers,  as  described,  Admiral  Scheer's  whole  com- 
mand was  more  in  hand  than  had  been  believed. 
The  intervals  were  closed  and  the  German  fleet  in 
better  readiness  for  its  rehearsed  manoeuvre,  to 
change  direction  of  the  line.  These  alterations  of 
speed  and  direction  also  probably  increased  the 
difficulties  of  the  British  in  locating  the  German 
fleet  at  this  time,  of  which  Lord  Jellicoe  writes  in 
describing  this  stage  of  the  action. 

Still  thinking  that  the  German  fleet  would  be 
encountered  more  to  the  eastward,  Lord  Jellicoe 
had  altered  the  course  of  the  Grand  Fleet  to  south 
and  then  to  southeast.  (6.02  and  6.08.)  The  Lion 
had  been  sighted,  and  at  6.06  had  signaled  that 
"the  enemy's  battle  cruisers  bore  southeast."  (J) 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND          21 

At  6.14  the  Lion  signaled,  "Have  sighted  the  en- 
emy's battle  fleet  bearing  south-southwest."  (J) 
Lord  Jellicoe  writes:  "This  report  gave  me  the 
first  information  on  which  I  could  take  effective 
action  for  deployment."  At  6.16  Lord  Jellicoe  made 
signal  to  the  Grand  Fleet  to  form  line  of  battle  on 
the  port  wing  column  on  a  course  southeast  by  east. 

In  the  meantime  the  light  German  forces  had 
become  involved  in  a  fight  between  the  lines  and 
were  withdrawing  under  cover  of  smoke  screens 
and  torpedo  attacks.  The  cruiser  Wiesbaden  was 
reported  disabled  at  6.02,  and  Scheer  turned  his 
fleet  two  points  to  port  "to  render  assistance  to 
the  Wiesbaden"  (S) — a  strange  reason  for  such 
a  move  at  such  a  time!  This  brought  on  what 
Admiral  Scheer  called  "heavy  fighting  round  the 
damaged  Wiesbaden,"  from  6.20.  Yet  this  eccen- 
tric thrust  of  the  German  fleet  actually  resulted  in 
heavy  damage  to  the  British. 

At  this  time  the  Grand  Fleet  was  deploying  as 
described,  but  not  yet  seriously  engaged.  Lord 
Jellicoe  reports  the  Marlborough  as  opening  fire  at 
6.17,  the  Iron  Duke  firing  a  few  salvos  at  6.20. 
But  Vice  Admiral  Beatty's  four  remaining  battle 
cruisers  were  in  closer  action,  as  Beatty  was  cross- 
ing the  German  van  on  a  course  turning  from  east 
to  southeast.  The  speed  of  the  deploying  Grand 


22          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

Fleet  had  been  reduced  to  14  knots  to  allow 
Beatty's  cruisers  to  pass  ahead,  "as  there  was 
danger  of  the  fire  of  the  Battle  Fleet  being  blank- 
eted by  them."  (J)  The  Fifth  Battle  Squadron 
had  been  left  behind  Beatty's  battle  cruisers  by  a 
long  interval,  and  was  making  a  turn  to  port  (at 
6.19)  to  form  astern  of  the  Grand  Fleet. 

Rear  Admiral  Hood's  Third  Squadron  of  three 
battle  cruisers  which  had  been  ordered  to  reinforce 
Beatty's  advance,  was  far  ahead  of  the  Grand 
Fleet,  and  had  overrun  to  the  southeast  in  the 
error  as  to  location.  On  realizing  this  mistake, 
Hood  had  turned  back  in  the  direction  of  the 
British  advance.  Hood's  squadron  was  signaled 
by  Vice  Admiral  Beatty  "to  form  single  line  ahead 
and  take  station"  (J)  ahead  of  Admiral  Beatty's 
four  remaining  battle  cruisers,  which  were  turned 
to  a  southeast  and  southerly  course  across  the 
van  of  the  German  fleet.  In  obedience  to  this 
signal,  Rear  Admiral  Hood  turned  to  take  station 
ahead  (6.21),  closing  to  a  range  of  8,000  yards 
(6.25).  "At  about  6.34"  (J)  his  flagship,  the  In- 
vincible, was  sunk  by  gunfire. 

Almost  at  the  same  time  three  of  Rear  Admiral 
Arbuthnot's  armored  cruisers,  Black  Prince,  War- 
rior, and  Defence,  "not  aware  of  the  approach  of 
the  enemy's  heavy  ships,"  (J)  were  put  out  of 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND          23 

action.  (Defence  was  sunk;  Warrior  sank  while 
attempt  was  being  made  to  tow  her  home;  Black 
Prince  was  sunk  later.)  In  the  turn  of  the  Fifth 
Battle  Squadron  to  take  position  astern  of  the 
Grand  Fleet  the  Warspite  had  jammed  her  helm 
and  was  out  of  control  for  a  while.  She  was  a 
good  deal  damaged  by  gunfire,  but  was  extricated 
from  her  predicament  and  taken  back  to  the  Brit- 
ish base. 

By  this  time  the  German  Commander-in-Chief 
had  received  information  from  his  torpedo  flotillas 
of  the  presence  of  "more  than  twenty  enemy  battle- 
ships following  a  southerly  course."  (S)  His  van 
was  under  heavy  fire.  "Following  the  movements 
of  the  enemy  they  had  made  a  bend  which  hindered 
free  action"  (S)  of  his  torpedo  flotilla,  and  his 
cruisers  were  also  cramped  between  the  fire  of  both 
lines.  In  this  awkward  situation  Admiral  Scheer 
resolved  to  make  use  of  his  prepared  manoeuvre, 
to  change  the  direction  of  his  line.  Accordingly 
at  6.35  "the  swing-around  was  carried  out  in  excel- 
lent style,"  (S)  the  ships  turning  simultaneously 
to  starboard,  putting  the  whole  German  fleet  on 
a  westerly  course. 

This  manoeuvre  was  covered  by  the  use  of  dense 
smoke  screens,  and  the  pressure  on  the  German 
fleet  was  relieved  at  once.  Admiral  Scheer  states 


24          THE   BATTLE   OF  JUTLAND 

that  "the  enemy  did  not  follow  our  veer  around," 
and  he  strongly  insists  that  the  British  should 
have  held  firmly  to  his  line  by  executing  a  similar 
manoeuvre.  But  he  really  gives  the  true  state  of 
the  case  when  he  writes:  "It  may  be  that  the 
leader  did  not  grasp  the  situation."  In  fact  none 
of  the  British  commanders  realized  what  had  taken 
place  under  cover  of  that  smoke  screen. 

After  the  sinking  of  the  Invincible,  although  Vice 
Admiral  Beatty  was  reported  as  turning  to  star- 
board, there  was  no  further  aggressive  action  on 
his  part  —  and,  in  the  next  fifteen  minutes  (6.50), 
he  signaled  the  two  remaining  battle  cruisers  of 
the  Third  Squadron  to  take  station  astern  of  the 
last  ship  of  his  line,  the  New  Zealand. 

At  the  same  time  (6.50)  the  Grand  Fleet,  which 
had  completed  deployment  at  6.38,  altered  course 
to  south  by  divisions  to  close. 

These  movements  of  the  British  forces  naturally 
did  not  succeed  in  bringing  any  pressure  upon 
the  Germans,  as  Admiral  Scheer's  whole  fleet  was 
then  safely  on  a  westerly  course,  as  a  result  of  the 
simultaneous  swing-around  of  his  line  —  and  the 
German  fleet  was  concealed  by  dense  smoke 
screens,  which  left  the  British  in  ignorance  of 
Scheer's  manoeuvre.  Encouraged  by  this  success- 
ful result  of  his  move,  and  finding  his  ships  all  able 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND          25 

to  keep  their  places  in  the  line,  "fully  prepared  to 
fight,"  (S)  the  German  Admiral  decided  upon  an 
unexpected  course  of  action.  His  change  of  tactics 
was  so  remarkable  that  his  reasons  should  be  quo- 
ted at  length : 

"It  was  still  too  early  for  a  nocturnal  move.  If 
the  enemy  followed  us,  our  action  in  retaining  the 
direction  taken  after  turning  the  line  would  par- 
take of  the  nature  of  a  retreat,  and  in  the  event 
of  any  damage  to  our  ships  in  the  rear  the  Fleet 
would  be  compelled  to  sacrifice  them  or  else  to 
decide  on  a  line  of  action  enforced  by  enemy  pres- 
sure, and  not  adopted  voluntarily,  and  would 
therefore  be  detrimental  to  us  from  the  very  outset. 
Still  less  was  it  feasible  to  strive  at  detaching  one- 
self from  the  enemy,  leaving  him  to  decide  when 
he  could  elect  to  meet  us  the  next  morning.  There 
was  but  one  way  of  averting  this  —  to  force  the 
enemy  into  a  second  battle  by  another  determined 
advance,  and  forcibly  compel  his  torpedo  boats  to 
attack.  The  success  of  the  turning  of  the  line 
while  fighting  encouraged  me  to  make  the  attempt, 
and  decided  me  to  make  still  further  use  of  the 
facility  of  movement.  The  manoeuvre  would  be 
bound  to  surprise  the  enemy,  to  upset  his  plans 
for  the  rest  of  the  day,  and  if  the  blow  fell  heavily 
it  would  facilitate  the  breaking  loose  at  night."  (S) 


26          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

To  carry  out  these  ideas  Admiral  Scheer  at  6.55 
executed  a  second  swing-around  of  his  whole  fleet 
turning  ships-right-about  to  starboard  as  before. 
This  put  the  German  fleet  again  on  an  easterly 
course  and  launched  its  van  in  an  attack  against 
the  deployed  British  line,  "to  deal  a  blow  at  the 
centre  of  the  enemy's  line."  (S)  Ahead  of  the 
fleet  there  was  sent  forward  a  determined  attack 
by  the  German  torpedo  flotillas,  all  of  which  "had 
orders  to  attack."  (S)  In  the  words  of  Admiral 
Scheer,  "This  led  to  the  intended  result,  a  full 
resumption  of  the  firing  at  the  van." 

The  practical  effect  in  action,  so  far  as  the  Ger- 
man Battle  Fleet  was  concerned,  was  to  subject 
the  van  of  the  German  fleet  to  heavy  damage, 
without  doing  any  compensating  harm  to  the  Brit- 
ish ships.  Admiral  Scheer  admits  this  damage  to 
the  German  fleet,  especially  the  battle  cruisers, 
and  it  is  established  that  the  German  fleet  did  not 
score  upon  the  Grand  Fleet.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  accompanying  sudden  torpedo  attacks,  emerg- 
ing from  the  smoke  directed  against  the  British 
battleships,  did  actually  accomplish  the  result  of 
making  the  Grand  Fleet  turn  away  and  open  the 
range.  Admiral  Scheer  claims  that  putting  the 
van  of  his  fleet  again  into  action  "diverted  the 
enemy  fire  and  rendered  it  possible  for  the  torpedo- 


THE  BATTLE   OF  JUTLAND          27 

boat  flotillas  to  take  so  effective  a  share  in  the  pro- 
ceedings," (S)  but  of  course  it  is  a  question  whether 
the  same  result  might  not  have  been  obtained  by 
the  use  of  the  torpedo  flotillas  alone. 

In  any  case,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  Ad- 
miral Scheer's  extraordinary  manoeuvres  had  ac- 
complished a  surprise  effect  upon  his  enemy  as, 
besides  forcing  the  Grand  Fleet  to  turn  away,  the 
moral  effect  of  this  torpedo  attack  had  a  great 
influence  upon  the  British  conduct  of  the  rest  of 
the  action.  It  is  also  evident  that  the  British  had 
not  comprehended  the  tactics  of  the  Germans. 

One  phase  of  the  situation  at  this  time  has  not 
been  understood  —  but  should  be  strongly  empha- 
sized. The  fact  is  that  the  German  Admiral,  by 
his  own  act,  had  again  placed  his  fleet  in  the  same 
position  from  which  he  had  once  withdrawn  —  and 
this  second  creation  of  the  same  situation  (6.55) 
was  after  the  Grand  Fleet  had  deployed  and  was  in 
line  of  battle.  Consequently,  in  view  of  the  way 
the  battle  was  really  fought,  many  of  the  long  argu- 
ments as  to  the  so-called  crucial  situation  at  the 
time  of  the  British  deployment  are  wasted  words. 
Now  that  it  is  known  that  Admiral  Scheer  came 
back  again  to  attack  the  fully  deployed  British 
fleet,  the  much-discussed  method  of  deployment 
can  no  longer  be  considered  all-important.  Even 


28          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

if  the  deployment  had  not  come  to  the  Germans, 
the  Germans  had  gone  to  the  deployment  —  and 
the  same  situation  existed.  In  their  ignorance  of 
the  German  Admiral's  smoke-screened  manoeuvres, 
both  sides  of  the  heated  British  controversy  have 
missed  the  essential  fact  of  this  unusual  duplication 
of  a  battle  situation,  which  actually  occurred  at 
Jutland. 

This  lack  of  understanding  of  Scheer's  turn  and 
return  is  plainly  shown  by  Admiral  Jellicoe,  who 
writes,  concerning  the  situation  after  7.00:  "Our 
alteration  of  course  to  the  south  had,  meanwhile, 
brought  the  enemy's  line  into  view  once  more." 
The  British  Command  did  not  realize  that  his 
enemy  had  actually  voluntarily  come  back  into 
the  former  position,  and  this  was  the  real  reason 
the  German  ships  had  reappeared. 

At  7.05  the  whole  British  battle  line  had  been 
turned  together  three  more  points  to  starboard. 
But  at  7.10  the  sudden  attack  of  the  German 
torpedo  flotillas  was  sighted,  and  shortly  after- 
wards the  British  fleet  was  turned  away  to  port 
two  points,  and  then  two  points  more,  to  avoid 
the  run  of  the  torpedoes.  Admiral  Jellicoe  states 
that  this  move  enabled  his  battleships  to  avoid 
many  torpedoes,  and  that  the  range  was  opened  by 
about  1,750  yards.  The  German  Admiral  claims 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND          29 

that  "the  action  of  the  torpedo-boat  flotillas  had 
achieved  its  purpose."  (S) 

After  accomplishing  this  result  of  making  his 
enemy  turn  away,  Admiral  Scheer  at  7.17  for  a 
third  time  successfully  executed  the  same  manoeu- 
vre of  ships-right-about  (in  this  third  turn  Scheer's 
flagship,  Friedrich  der  Grosse,  was  cramped  and 
made  the  turn  to  port),  and  again  his  fleet  was  on 
a  westerly  course  screened  by  dense  smoke.  This 
swing-around  again  had  the  same  effect  of  freeing 
the  German  fleet  from  the  gunfire  of  the  British 
fleet.  The  British  Command  again  did  not  grasp 
the  full  import  of  the  German  move.  He  writes 
of  the  difficulty  of  observation  in  the  mist  and 
smoke.  Some  of  his  subordinates  reported  that 
the  Germans  had  turned  away  at  this  time,  but 
none  realized  that  a  ships-right-about  had  been 
carried  out.  It  was  not  until  7.41  that  the  British 
battle  fleet  was  altered  by  divisions  three  points 
to  starboard  to  close. 

Shortly  after  (at  7.47),  Vice  Admiral  Beatty 
made  signal  to  Lord  Jellicoe:  "Urgent.  Submit 
that  the  van  of  battleships  follow  the  cruisers.  We 
can  then  cut  off  the  whole  of  the  enemy's  battle 
fleet."  Much  has  been  made  of  this  signal  by 
ill-advised  critics.  In  fact  it  will  be  self-evident 
that,  at  the  time  Beatty's  signal  was  sent,  the  Ger- 


30          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

man  fleet  was  not  in  the  assumed  position,  but  had 
long  before  been  extricated  from  its  dangerous  con- 
tact by  the  third  "swing-around"  (S)  at  7.17,  and 
the  Germans  ships  were  again  safely  proceeding  on 
their  altered  course. 

It  is  a  strange  comment  on  the  battle  to  realize 
that  the  thrice  executed  German  manoeuvre  of 
ships-right-about  was  not  observed  by  anyone  on 
the  British  fleet.  None  of  the  British  maps  or 
charts  of  the  action  shows  any  sign  of  these  move- 
ments. Chart  No.  1  is  a  typical  British  diagram 
of  this  stage  of  the  action.  It  will  be  noted  that 
the  times  (6.15  to  7.41)  in  the  indications  of  the 
course  of  the  German  fleet  include  the  times  of 
all  three  turns  of  ships-right-about.  (6.35,  6.55, 
7.17.)  Yet  there  is  no  trace  of  these  German 
manoeuvres  on  the  plan.  Chart  No.  2  shows  the 
contrast  between  the  supposed  movements  of 
the  Germans  and  their  actual  manoeuvres  in 
the  battle. 

One  reason  for  the  failure  of  the  British  to  under- 
stand these  manoeuvres  of  Admiral  Scheer  was  the 
fixed  conviction  of  the  British  that  such  a  simul- 
taneous turn  of  all  the  ships  of  a  fleet  was  imprac- 
ticable in  action  —  consequently  they  did  not 
expect  it  to  be  used  by  their  enemies.  This  doc- 
trine has  been  stated  by  Lord  Jellicoe  in  explaining 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 


31 


COURSE  OFTHE  GERMAN 
HIGH  SEAS  FLEET 


7-41 


7.59 


CHART  NO.  1 

Typical  British  Chart,  of  the  later  manoeuvres  of  the  action  which 
are  in  dispute. 

It  will  be  noted  that,  in  the  time  covered,  between  6.15  and  7.41,  the 
course  of  the  German  Fleet  gives  no  indication  of  the  thrice  executed 
change  of  direction  of  the  German  line  by  ships-right-about.  All  of  these 
were  carried  out  within  this  period  (6.35,  6.55,  7.17). 

Lord  Jellicoe's  own  maps  show  this  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  German 
manoeuvres  of  ships-right-about,  as  they  do  not  indicate  these  important 
moves  of  the  Germans.  In  his  report  Admiral  Jellicoe  spoke  of  the  "turn- 
away  under  cover  of  torpedo-boat  destroyer  attacks"  (J)  as  "difficult  to 
counter"  (J) — but  he  did  not  understand  the  real  reason  that  made  the 
difficulty. 


32          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

his  own  movements  in  the  battle.  "The  objection 
to  altering  by  turning  all  the  ships  together  was 
the  inevitable  confusion  that  would  have  ensued 
as  the  result  of  such  a  manoeuvre  carried  out  with 
a  very  large  fleet  under  action  conditions  in  misty 
weather."  This  positive  statement  was  made  by 
the  British  Commander-in- Chief  in  perfect  uncon- 
sciousness that  his  antagonist  had  in  fact  success- 
fully carried  out  such  a  turn  three  times  under  the 
identical  conditions  described! 

After  the  turn  to  a  westerly  course,  the  German 
fleet  was  brought  around  to  a  southwesterly,  south- 
erly, and  finally  to  a  southeasterly  course  "to  meet 
the  enemy's  encircling  movements  and  keep  open 
a  way  for  our  return."  (S)  From  this  time  Ad- 
miral Scheer's  fleet  was  not  in  great  danger,  nor 
even  seriously  engaged.  As  the  twilight  advanced 
the  German  Command  could  prepare  for  the  night. 
He  found  all  his  battleships  in  condition  to  do  16 
knots  "the  speed  requisite  for  night  work,  and 
thus  keep  their  places  in  the  line. "  (S)  Vice  Ad- 
miral Hipper's  flagship  the  Liitzow  had  been  so 
badly  damaged  that  he  had  changed  his  flag  to 
the  Moltke  (7.00). l  At  7.30  the  Liitzow  could  do  15 
knots,  and  her  condition  grew  worse  steadily,  but 

1  It  was  nearly  two  hours  before  Vice  Admiral  Hipper  could  get 
on  board  the  Moltke. 


THE  BATTLE   OF  JUTLAND          33 

she  was  the  only  ship  that  could  not  be  relied  upon 
to  maintain  fleet  speed. 

Consequently  Admiral  Scheer  was  not  hard 
pressed  at  this  stage,  but  only  intermittently  en- 
gaged. The  order  of  the  German  fleet,  after  the 
last  turn  to  westerly,  had  been  Squadron  II,  Squad- 
ron I,  Squadron  III.  Squadron  II  (the  slower  pre- 
dreadnoughts)  fell  out  to  starboard,  and  was  passed 
by  Squadrons  I  and  III,  giving  support  to  Hipper's 
battle  cruisers,  which  were  engaged  at  8.20.  The 
Germans  were  all  the  time  making  use  of  smoke  for 
concealment,  in  addition  to  the  mist  and  the  in- 
creasing darkness. 

As  a  result  of  these  tactics,  the  British  Admiral 
was  always  groping  for  his  enemy  in  mist  and 
smoke,  with  only  occasional  glimpses  of  the  Ger- 
man ships.  Although  he  had  not  understood  the 
German  manoeuvre,  Lord  Jellicoe  had  become  con- 
vinced that  the  Germans  had  turned  away,  and  at 
7.59  he  had  altered  course  by  divisions  to  west  to 
close  his  enemy.  It  was  again  natural  that  he  did 
not  gain  much  actual  contact.  Lord  Jellicoe  writes 
of  the  fighting,  already  mentioned,  at  8.20,  in 
which  the  battle  cruisers  of  both  sides  and  the 
German  predreadnoughts  were  engaged,  and  ex- 
plains the  puzzling  conditions  of  the  action  at  this 
stage.  "At  8.30  P.M.  the  light  was  failing  and  the 


34          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

fleet  was  turned  by  divisions  to  a  southwest  course, 
thus  reforming  single  line  again."  (J)  All  this 
time  his  elusive  enemy  was  screening  his  move- 
ments by  the  use  of  smoke,  and  the  German  ships 
would  only  occasionally  be  visible  in  the  smoke 
and  mist. 

As  the  darkness  came  on,  it  is  evident  that  these 
tactics  on  the  part  of  the  Germans,  with  increasing 
threats  of  torpedo  attacks,  became  more  and  more 
baffling  to  the  British  Command,  and  then  came 
the  crucial  decision  which  ended  the  battle.  Ad- 
miral Jellicoe  reports: 

"At  9  P.M.  the  enemy  was  entirely  out  of  sight, 
and  the  threat  of  torpedoboat-destroyer  attacks 
during  the  rapidly  approaching  darkness  made  it 
necessary  for  me  to  dispose  of  the  fleet  for  the 
night,  with  a  view  to  its  safety  from  such  attacks, 
while  providing  for  a  renewal  of  action  at  daylight. 
I  accordingly  manoeuvred  to  remain  between  the 
enemy  and  his  bases,  placing  our  flotillas  in  a  posi- 
tion in  which  they  would  afford  protection  to  the 
fleet  from  destroyer  attack  and  at  the  same  time 
be  favorably  situated  for  attacking  the  enemy's 
heavy  ships." 

Concerning  this  stage  of  the  action  Admiral 
Jellicoe  in  his  report  quotes  Vice  Admiral  Beatty 
as  follows:  "In  view  of  the  gathering  darkness 


THE  BATTLE   OF  JUTLAND          35 

and  the  fact  that  our  strategical  position  was  such 
as  to  make  it  appear  certain  that  we  should  locate 
the  enemy  at  daylight  under  most  favorable  cir- 
cumstances, I  did  not  consider  it  desirable  or  proper 
to  close  the  enemy  battle-fleet  during  the  dark 
hours." 

Here  the  British  Admiral  and  his  subordinate 
were  in  accord,  but  of  course  the  responsibility 
for  the  movements  of  the  British  fleet  rested  with 
Admiral  Jellicoe,  as  Commander-in-Chief.  By  his 
order  the  British  fleet  steamed  through  the  dark 
hours  on  southerly  courses  "some  eighty -five 
miles"  (J)  from  the  battlefield.  Although  the 
British  fleet  was  thus  placed  in  the  general  direc- 
tion of  Heligoland,  this  meant  that  Admiral  Jellicoe 
relinquished  contact,  in  a  military  sense,  with  the 
German  fleet.  At  the  time  it  was  undoubtedly 
Lord  Jellicoe 's  intention  to  renew  the  action  the 
next  day,  but  it  must  be  clearly  understood  that  this 
was  to  be  in  every  way  a  new  naval  battle  —  not  a 
battle  continued  by  keeping  in  touch  with  his  en- 
emy and  reexerting  his  force  on  the  following  day. 

Admiral  Jellicoe  himself  is  explicit  upon  this 
point,  and  states  that  "at  9  P.M."  he  ordered  his 
fleet  "to  alter  course  by  divisions  to  south,  inform- 
ing the  Flag  officers  of  the  Battle  Cruiser  Fleet, 
the  cruiser  and  light  cruiser  squadrons,  and  the 


36          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

officers  commanding  destroyer  flotillas,  of  my 
movements  in  order  that  they  should  conform."  (J) 
Nothing  could  be  more  definitely  established  than 
the  fact  that  this  broke  off  the  action  of  fleets  in 
every  real  sense  of  the  word.  The  British  light 
craft  were  to  conform  to  the  movements  of  the 
Battle  Fleet,  and  there  was  no  hint  of  maintaining 
a  screen  or  contact  that  would  develop  the  posi- 
tion of  the  enemy  fleet. 

This  situation  should  be  kept  clearly  in  mind. 
There  were  many  encounters  throughout  the  night 
between  British  and  German  war-craft  of  various 
types,  but  these  fought  on  their  own  initiative,  and 
there  was  no  concerted  touch  maintained  with  the 
German  fleet  —  nothing  that  could  be  called  a 
part  of  a  battle  of  fleets.  The  Germans  simply 
ploughed  their  way  home  through  the  stragglers 
left  in  the  wake  of  the  British  fleet,  and  Lord  Jelli- 
coe  frankly  states  that  he  was  out  of  touch  with 
his  cruisers  and  destroyers.  Consequently  Lord 
Jellicoe's  decision,  and  move  to  the  south,  ended 
the  Battle  of  Jutland. 

This  should  be  recognized  as  the  final  decision 
of  the  battle,  and  the  British  Commander-in-Chief 
makes  it  plain  that  he  so  considered  it,  as  he  states 
the  situation  at  the  time  and  the  reasons  which 
influenced  him. 


THE  BATTLE   OF  JUTLAND          3T 

At  9  o'clock  the  German  fleet  was  to  the  west- 
ward. The  British  fleet  was  between  it  and  all  its 
bases.  The  British  fleet  was  superior  in  speed, 
and  had  such  an  overwhelming  superiority  in  ships 
and  guns  that  it  could  afford  to  discard  its  dam- 
aged ships  without  impairing  this  superiority.  The 
British  Admiral  had  light  cruisers  and  destroyers, 
to  throw  out  a  screen  and  to  maintain  touch  with 
the  German  fleet.  There  was  a  proportion  of 
damaged  ships  in  the  German  fleet;  and  this,  with 
its  original  inferior  fleet  speed,  would  have  made 
it  a  hard  task  for  the  German  fleet  to  ease  around 
the  British  fleet  and  reach  the  German  bases. 
These  conditions  were  in  favor  of  keeping  in  touch 
with  the  German  fleet. 

On  the  other  hand,  for  Admiral  Jellicoe  to  have 
kept  his  fleet  in  touch  with  the  German  fleet 
through  the  dark  hours,  even  by  the  most  efficient 
use  of  his  screen  of  destroyers  and  cruisers,  would 
have  meant  taking  the  risk  of  a  night  action, 
which  would  have  involved  his  capital  ships,  as 
Admiral  Scheer  intended  to  fight  his  way  through 
that  night.  Above  all  things  there  was  the  omi- 
nous threat  of  torpedo  attacks  in  the  night,  with 
possibilities  of  disaster  to  the  Battle  Fleet  upon 
which  depended  the  established  British  control  of 
the  seas. 


38          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

Lord  Jellicoe's  arguments  show  that  he  followed 
a  line  of  conduct  well  considered  in  advance,1  and 
he  writes  with  a  sincere  conviction  that  his  act  in 
breaking  off  the  battle  was  justified  by  the  results. 
In  explaining  the  many  advantages  possessed  by 
the  weaker  German  fleet  Admiral  Jellicoe  also  re- 
veals disappointing  conditions  in  backwardness  of 
methods  on  the  part  of  the  British  Navy.  There 
was  not  alone  the  lack  of  modern  methods  in  range- 
finding  and  director  fire-control,  but  also  in  torpedo 
attack  and  defense,  and  in  preparation  for  action 
"under  night  conditions."  (J) 2  It  is  something  of 
a  shock  to  read  that  the  stronger  British  fleet  went 
into  the  Jutland  battle  with  a  handicap  in  these 
essentials  that  became  a  factor  to  prevent  a  de- 
cisive action.3  Lord  Jellicoe  makes  a  very  strong 

1  Lord  Jellicoe  had  sent  to  the  Admiralty  a  formal  dispatch 
(October  30,  1914)  stating  his  conviction  that  the  Germans  would 
"rely  to  a  great  extent  on  submarines,  mines  and  torpedoes,"  (J) 
and  defining  his  own  "tactical  methods  in  relation  to  these  forms 
of  attack."     (J)     On  November  7,  1914,  the  Admiralty  approved 
the  "views  stated  therein."     Lord  Jellicoe  in  his  book  cites  this 
Admiralty  approval  of  1914  as  applying  to  the  Battle  of  Jutland. 

2  "The   German   organization   at   night   is   very   good.     Their 
system  of  recognition  signals  is  excellent.     Ours  are  practically 
nil.     Their  searchlights  are  superior  to  ours,  and  they  use  them 
with  great  effect.     Finally,  their  method    of  firing  at  night  gives 
excellent  results.     I  am   reluctantly   of   the  opinion  that  under 
night  conditions  we  have  a  good  deal  to  learn  from  them."     (J) 

3  "The  British  Fleet  was  not  properly  equipped  for  fighting  an 
action  at  night.    The  German  fleet  was.    Consequently  to  fight 


THE  BATTLE   OF  JUTLAND          39 

plea  for  his  contention  that,  under  the  existing 
conditions  of  smoke,  mist  and  darkness,  with  the 
German  fleet  skilfully  taking  advantage  of  these 
conditions,  and  with  the  handicaps  of  the  Grand 
Fleet  in  construction,  equipment,  and  methods  to 
contend  with  these  tactics  and  conditions,  there 
was  no  opportunity  to  force  a  decision  without 
prohibitive  risks  of  losing  the  existing  supremacy 
of  the  British  Navy  on  the  seas.1 

Accordingly,  at  9  o'clock  Admiral  Jellicoe  dis- 
posed the  British  battleships  for  the  night  in  col- 
umns of  divisions  abeam  one  mile  apart,  to  insure 
the  columns  not  losing  sight  of  one  another  through 
the  dark  hours.  The  destroyer  flotillas  were  di- 
rected to  take  station  five  miles  astern.  In  this 
order  the  British  fleet  steamed  through  the  night 
at  seventeen  knots  "some  85  miles"  (J)  on  a 
southerly  course.  The  only  British  ship  that  is 
mentioned  as  having  been  given  another  mission 
was  the  small  minelayer  Abdiel  which  was  sent 
to  strew  mines  in  an  area  off  the  Vyl  Lightship 
"over  which  it  was  expected  the  High  Seas  Fleet 
would  pass  if  the  ships  attempted  to  regain  their 

them  at  night  would  only  have  been  to  court  disaster.  Lord  Jelli- 
coe's  business  was  to  preserve  the  Grand  Fleet,  the  main  defense 
of  the  Empire  as  well  as  of  the  Allied  cause,  not  to  risk  its  existence." 
Sir  Percy  Scott,  Fifty  Years  in  the  Royal  Navy. 

1  See  4  Guide  to  the  Military  History  of  The  World  War,  pp.  320-22. 


40          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

ports  during  the  night  via  the  Horn  Reef."  (J) 
No  other  craft  was  assigned  to  observe  or  harass 
the  German  fleet.  The  Sixth  Division  of  the 
Grand  Fleet  had  fallen  behind,  as  the  Marlborough, 
which  had  been  damaged  by  a  torpedo,  could  not 
maintain  fleet  speed.  (This  ship  had  to  be  sent 
back  after  2  A.M.,  and  Sir  Cecil  Burney  transferred 
his  flag  to  the  Revenge.}  The  British  light  craft 
also  became  widely  scattered  in  the  dark  hours. 

Within  a  few  minutes  of  the  time  of  Lord  Jel- 
licoe's  signal  for  the  move  to  the  south,  Ad- 
miral Scheer  gave  his  order  for  the  night  (9.06), 
"course  S.  S.  E.  X  E.  speed  16  knots."  (S)  The 
German  Admiral  fully  expected  to  be  attacked  by 
the  British  fleet  and  to  meet  strong  opposition,  but 
he  decided  that  the  German  "main  fleet  in  close 
formation  was  to  make  for  Horn  Reef  by  the 
shortest  route."  (S)  The  fleet  was  disposed  in  the 
same  order,  Squadrons  I,  III,  II,  with  the  battle 
cruisers  covering  the  rear  —  "out  of  consideration 
for  their  damaged  condition."  (S)  The  German 
Admiral  placed  these  weaker  ships  in  the  rear,  as 
he  thought  his  van  would  encounter  resistance  and 
might  be  heavily  engaged  in  the  expected  night 
action.  His  torpedo  flotillas  were  disposed  "in 
an  E.  N.  E.  to  S.  S.  W.  direction,  which  was  where 
the  enemy  Main  Fleet  could  be  expected."  (S) 


THE  BATTLE   OF  JUTLAND          41 

Thus  disposed  the  German  Battle  Fleet  moved 
through  the  dark  hours,  on  a  straight  course  for 
Horn  Reef,  without  meeting  the  expected  attacks, 
which  the  strong  Squadron  I  in  the  van  was  pre- 
pared to  ward  off.  There  really  was  no  chance  of 
engaging  the  British  battleships,  as  the  Grand 
Fleet  had  moved  to  the  south  before  the  German 
fleet  crossed  Lord  Jellicoe's  course.  The  Nassau 
got  out  of  station,  when  she  struck  a  stray  British 
destroyer  in  the  darkness,  and  made  for  a  morning 
rendezvous.  The  rest  of  the  dreadnoughts  of  the 
High  Seas  Fleet  met  no  delay  nor  mishap  through 
the  dark  hours.  Of  the  predreadnoughts,  the  battle- 
ship Pommern  was  sunk  by  a  mine  or  torpedo,  with 
loss  of  all  hands. 

Many  of  the  destroyers  had  fired  all  their  tor- 
pedoes, and  these  craft  were  used  for  emergencies. 
They  were  very  necessary,  as  the  disabled  cruisers 
Rostock  and  Elbing  were  abandoned  and  blown 
up,  and  these  destroyers  did  good  service  in  taking 
off  the  crews.  They  also  rescued  the  crew  of  the 
disabled  Liitzow,  which  was  towed  through  the 
darkness  until  she  was  so  down  by  the  head  that 
her  screws  spun  in  the  air.  She  was  abandoned 
and  destroyed  by  a  torpedo  at  1.45  A.M.  Admiral 
Scheer  cites  the  fact  that  these  events  could  hap- 
pen, without  disturbance  by  the  enemy,  as  "prov- 


42          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

ing  that  the  English  Naval  forces  made  no  attempt 
to  occupy  the  waters  between  the  scene  of  battle 
and  Horn  Reef."  (S) 

As  a  matter  of  fact  this  did  not  need  any  proof, 
because  the  British  fleet  held  steadily  on  its  south- 
erly course,  without  regard  to  the  direction  taken 
by  the  Germans.  In  the  wake  of  the  Grand  Fleet 
were  left  scattered  cruisers  and  destroyers  —  and 
there  were  many  clashes  between  these  and  the 
Germans,  but  all  were  isolated  fights  and  adven- 
tures of  lame  ducks.  Some  of  these  encounters 
were  reported  to  Lord  Jellicoe  and  there  was  much 
shooting,  with  explosions  and  fire  lighting  up  the 
darkness. 

Admiral  Scheer  thought  that  all  this  must  have 
indicated  his  position,  and,  even  after  not  en- 
countering the  expected  night  attacks,  the  Ger- 
man Admiral  expected  the  British  to  renew  the 
battle  promptly  at  dawn.  But  in  consequence  of 
the  British  Admiral's  dispositions  for  the  night,  it 
is  evident  that  the  position  of  the  German  fleet 
was  not  developed,  as  Admiral  Jellicoe  himself  says, 
until  "the  information  obtained  from  our  wireless 
directional  stations  during  the  early  morning."  (J) 

As  dawn  was  breaking,  "at  about  2.47  A.M."  (J) 
June  1,  Admiral  Jellicoe  altered  course  of  his  fleet 
to  the  north  to  retrace  his  path  of  the  night  before. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND          43 

His  Sixth  Division  of  battleships  had  dropped 
astern,  out  of  sight.  His  cruisers  and  destroyers 
were  badly  scattered,  and  the  British  Admiral 
abandoned  his  intention  of  seeking  a  new  battle  on 
the  first  of  June. 

The  straggling  of  portions  of  his  fleet  during 
the  move  through  the  darkness  is  explained  by 
Lord  Jellicoe,  and  this  caused  him  to  delay  his 
search  for  the  German  fleet  until  he  could  pick 
up  the  missing  craft.  His  return  to  find  these 
was  the  reason  for  retracing  the  course  of  the  night 
manoeuvre.  The  following  is  quoted  from  Lord 
Jellicoe's  book:  "The  difficulty  experienced  in  col- 
lecting the  fleet  (particularly  the  destroyers),  due 
to  the  above  causes,  rendered  it  undesirable  for 
the  Battle  Fleet  to  close  the  Horn  Reef  at  daylight, 
as  had  been  my  intention  when  deciding  to  steer 
to  the  southward  during  the  night.  It  was  obvi- 
ously necessary  to  concentrate  the  Battle  Fleet 
and  the  destroyers  before  renewing  action.  By 
the  time  this  concentration  was  effected  it  had 
become  apparent  that  the  High  Seas  Fleet,  steer- 
ing for  the  Horn  Reef,  had  passed  behind  the 
shelter  of  the  German  mine  fields  in  the  early 
morning  on  their  way  to  their  ports." 

Admiral  Scheer's  fleet  had  arrived  off  Horn  Reef 
at  3  A.M.,  where  he  waited  for  the  disabled  Lutzow. 


44          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

At  3.30  he  learned  that  she  had  been  abandoned. 
Up  to  that  time  the  German  Admiral  had  ex- 
pected a  new  battle  of  fleets,  but  he  soon  divined 
that  he  was  to  be  free  from  pressure  on  the  part 
of  his  enemy.  This  was  confirmed  when  Admiral 
Scheer  learned  through  a  German  aircraft  scout  of 
the  straggling  of  Lord  Jellicoe's  ships.  (L  11  was 
the  airship  reported  by  the  British  "shortly  after 
3.30.")  Admiral  Scheer 's  comment  is:  "It  is  ob- 
vious that  this  scattering  of  the  forces  —  which 
can  only  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  after  the 
day-battle  Admiral  Jellicoe  had  lost  the  general 
command  —  induced  the  Admiral  to  avoid  a  fresh 
battle."  Both  commanders  are  consequently  on 
record  in  agreement  as  to  the  reason  for  no  new 
battle  of  fleets. 

The  Germans  were  thus  enabled  to  proceed  to 
their  bases  undisturbed.  Admiral  Scheer's  ac- 
count of  the  return  of  the  German  fleet  to  its  home 
ports,  and  of  the  condition  of  his  ships,  is  convinc- 
ing —  and  there  is  no  longer  any  question  as  to 
the  German  losses.  On  the  way  home  the  Ostfries- 
land  struck  a  mine,  but  was  not  seriously  injured, 
making  port  without  difficulty.  Outside  of  the 
destruction  of  the  Liltzow,  the  German  battle 
cruiser  squadron  was  badly  battered.  The  Seyd- 
litz  had  great  difficulty  in  making  her  berth,  and 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND          45 

the  Derfflinger  was  also  seriously  damaged.  To 
sum  up  the  damage  done  to  the  battle  cruisers  of 
both  fleets  makes  a  sorry  showing  for  this  type  of 
warship,  which  had  so  great  a  vogue  before  The 
World  War. 

Admiral  Scheer  states  that,  with  the  exception 
of  his  two  battle  cruisers,  the  German  fleet  was 
repaired  and  ready  to  go  to  sea  again  by  the  middle 
of  August,  and  the  Bayern  (the  first  German  war- 
ship to  mount  38  c.m.-guns)  had  been  added  to 
the  fleet.  He  also  gives  an  account  of  another 
sortie  (August  18  to  20,  1916).  Later  in  the  year 
the  German  fleet  was  reinforced  by  the  Baden 
(38  c.m.-guns)  and  the  battle  cruiser  Hindenburg, 
but  at  the  end  of  1916  the  function  of  the  High 
Seas  Fleet  was  to  keep  the  gates  for  the  U-boats 
in  the  great  German  submarine  campaign. 

In  this  role  of  covering  the  operations  of  the 
submarines  the  German  Battle  Fleet  had  a  very 
important  influence  upon  the  ensuing  stages  of 
the  War.  It  was  altogether  a  delusion  to  think 
that  the  career  of  the  German  fleet  had  been 
ended  at  Jutland  —  and  that  it  "never  came  out." 
On  the  contrary,  Admiral  Scheer's  fleet  kept  a 
wide  area  cleared  for  the  egress  and  entrance  of  the 
German  U-boats  in  their  destructive  campaign. 
If  the  German  fleet  had  been  destroyed  in  the 


46          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

Jutland  action,  it  would  have  been  possible  for 
the  Allies  to  put  in  place  and  maintain  mine 
barrages  close  to  the  German  bases.  There  is  no 
need  to  add  anything  to  this  statement  to  show 
the  great  results  that  would  have  been  gained,  if 
the  British  had  been  able  to  win  a  decision  in  the 
Battle  of  Jutland. 


The  losses  in  the  battle  were  as  follows: 
BRITISH 

Tons 

QUEEN  MABY                            (Battle  Cruiser)  26,350 

INDEFATIGABLE                          (Battle  Cruiser)  18,800 

INVINCIBLE                                 (Battle  Cruiser)  17,250 

DEFENCE                                    (Armored  Cruiser)  14,600 

WARKIOB                                    (Armored  Cruiser)  13,550 

BLACK  PRINCE                           (Armored  Cruiser)  13,350 

TIPPEBABY                                  (Destroyer)  1,430 

NESTOR                                       (Destroyer)  890 

NOMAD                                        (Destroyer)  890 

TUBBULENT                                (Destroy 'er)  1,100 

FOBTUNE                                     (Destroyer)  965 

ABDENT                                       (Destroyer)  935 

SHARK                                         (Destroyer)  935 

SPARROWHAWK                          (Destroyer)  935 


Total  tonnage  111,980 
GERMAN 

Tone 

(Battle  Cruiser)  26,180 

POMMERN                                    (Predreadnought)  13,200 

WIESBADEN                               (Cruiser)  5,400 

ELBING                                        (Cruiser)  4,500 

ROSTOCK                                     (Cruiser)  4,900 

FRAUENLOB                               (Cruiser)  2,700 


THE  BATTLE   OF  JUTLAND  47 

Tons 

V-4  (Destroyer)  570 

V-48  (Destroyer)  750 

V-27  (Destroyer')  640 

V-29  (Destroyer)  640 

S-33  (Destroyer)  700 


Total  tonnage  60,180 

Killed  and  wounded: 

British  (approximately)  6,600 

German  3,076 

In  the  early  British  accounts  of  the  battle  there 
were  fanciful  tales  of  pursuit  of  the  German  ships, 
through  the  night,  and  even  after  Admiral  Jelli- 
coe's  Report  the  British  public  did  not  at  first 
realize  the  situation  at  the  end  of  the  action.  But 
after  a  time,  when  this  was  better  understood, 
there  arose  one  of  the  greatest  naval  controversies 
that  have  ever  agitated  Great  Britain,  centered 
around  the  alleged  "defensive"  naval  policy  for 
maintaining  the  supremacy  of  Great  Britain  on 
the  seas,  —  the  pros  and  cons  as  to  closing  the 
Germans  while  there  was  light,  and  keeping  in 
touch  through  the  dark  hours. 

This  controversy  as  to  the  Battle  of  Jutland  has 
been  carried  on  with  bitterness  in  Great  Britain, 
and  volumes  of  matter  have  been  written  that  will 
be  utterly  useless,  so  far  as  a  true  story  of  the 
action  is  concerned.  Partisans  have  made  the  mis- 
take of  putting  on  record  arguments  that  have 
been  founded  on  phases  of  the  British  operations  — 


48          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

with  imaginary  corresponding  situations  of  the 
enemy,  which  never  existed  in  actual  fact.  The 
preceding  account  may  be  relied  upon  as  tracing 
the  main  events  of  the  battle  —  and  the  real  course 
of  the  action  shows  that  many  briefs  must  be 
thrown  out  of  court. 

Putting  aside  these  contentions,  and  seeking  only 
to  visualize  the  truth,  one  is  forced  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  chief  cause  of  failure  on  the  part  of 
the  British  fleet  was  the  obvious  handicap  that 
methods  had  not  been  devised  in  advance  for  de- 
cisive  operations  under  the  existing  conditions. 

The  problem  for  the  British  was  to  unite  two 
parts  of  a  superior  force,  and  to  impose  this  united 
superior  force  with  destructive  effect  upon  the 
enemy.  This  problem  was  simplified  by  the  fact 
that  the  weaker  enemy  voluntarily  came  into  con- 
tact in  a  position  where  escape  by  flight  was  out 
of  the  question.  On  the  other  hand,  the  solution 
was  made  difficult  by  unusual  conditions  of  mist 
and  smoke. 

The  decision  was  missed  through  the  lack  of 
rehearsed  methods,  not  only  for  effectively  joining 
the  British  forces,  but  for  bringing  into  contact 
the  superior  British  strength,  against  an  enemy 
who  actually  possessed  the  great  advantage  of  re- 
hearsed methods  adapted  to  the  existing  conditions. 


THE  BATTLE   OF  JUTLAND  49 

These  conditions  must  be  realized  in  order  to  ar- 
rive at  a  fair  verdict. 

When  considering  the  Battle  of  Jutland,  we 
must  not  think  in  the  old  terms  of  small  dimen- 
sions, but  we  must  picture  the  long  miles  of  battle 
lines  wreathed  in  mist  and  smoke,  the  great  areas 
of  manoeuvre  —  and  the  complicated  difficulties 
that  must  beset  anyone  who  was  called  to  com- 
mand in  this  first  great  battle  of  dreadnoughts. 
These  widely  extended  manoeuvres  of  ships,  only 
intermittently  visible,  must  not  be  thought  of  as 
merely  positions  on  a  chart  or  game-board. 

Reviewing  the  course  of  the  action,  the  conclu- 
sion cannot  be  avoided  that,  on  the  day  of  the 
battle  and  under  its  conditions,  the  Germans  were 
better  prepared  in  advance  for  a  battle  of  fleets. 
In  his  book  Lord  Jellicoe  states  many  advantages 
possessed  by  the  German  fleet  in  construction, 
armament,  and  equipment  —  but,  as  has  been 
said,  his  revelation  of  the  British  lack  of  methods 
is  more  significant. 

All  these  deficiencies  cannot  be  charged  against 
Admiral  Jellicoe,  and  the  persistent  efforts  to  give 
him  all  the  blame  are  unjust.  Is  there  any  real 
evidence  that  another  man  would  have  done  better 
under  the  circumstances?  The  tendency  of  cer- 
tain writers  to  laud  Vice  Admiral  Beatty  at  the 


50          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

expense  of  Admiral  Jellicoe  does  not  seem  justi- 
fied. As  has  been  noted,  when  contact  was  estab- 
lished with  the  German  advance  force,  Beatty 
failed  to  bring  his  full  strength  into  action  against 
this  isolated  weaker  enemy  force.  In  the  ensuing 
stages  it  cannot  be  denied  that  haphazard  methods 
were  in  evidence. 

The  idea  must  be  put  aside  that  the  German 
ships  were  a  huddled,  helpless  prey  "delivered'* 
to  the  British  Commander-in-Chief.  On  the  con- 
trary, as  stated,  the  German  battle  cruisers  had 
already  closed  up  with  the  German  battleships 
and  the  High  Seas  Fleet  had  been  slowed  down  to 
correct  its  formations.  Consequently  at  this  stage 
the  German  fleet  was  in  hand  and  ready  to  sheer 
off,  by  use  of  their  well  rehearsed  elusive  manoeuvre 
of  ships-right-about,  with  baffling  concealment  in 
smoke  screens.  It  has  been  shown  that  after  the 
Grand  Fleet  had  completed  deployment,  the  un- 
suspected situation  existed  in  which  Admiral 
Scheer's  fleet  was  again  in  close  contact  with  the 
British  fleet.  It  has  also  been  explained  that  Vice 
Admiral  Beatty  made  his  much  discussed  signal, 
to  "cut  off"  the  German  fleet,  long  after  Admiral 
Scheer  had  put  his  fleet  into  safety  by  his  third 
swing-around  of  the  German  ships.  With  these 
situations  totally  uncomprehended,  it  cannot  be 


THE  BATTLE   OF  JUTLAND          51 

said  that  Vice  Admiral  Beatty  had  a  firmer  grasp 
upon  the  actual  conditions  than  anyone  else.  The 
simple  truth  is,  the  British  Command  was  always 
compelled  to  grope  for  the  German  ships,  while  his 
enemies  were  executing  carefully  rehearsed  elusive 
manoeuvres  concealed  in  smoke  —  and  the  British 
were  not  prepared  in  advance  to  counter  these 
tactics. 

In  the  matter  of  signaling,  the  Germans  were 
far  ahead  —  in  that  they  had  their  manoeuvres 
carefully  prepared  in  advance,  to  be  executed  with 
the  minimum  number  of  signals.  The  result  was 
that,  while  the  British  Commander-in-Chief  was 
obliged  to  keep  up  a  constant  succession  of  in- 
structions by  signals,  the  German  Admiral  was 
able  to  perform  his  surprising  manoeuvres  with 
comparatively  few  master  signals.1  Lord  Jellicoe 
also  emphasizes  the  great  advantage  possessed  by 
the  Germans  in  their  recognition  signals  at  night. 

Sir  Percy  Scott,  as  already  quoted,  bluntly 
states:  "The  British  Fleet  was  not  properly 
equipped  for  fighting  an  action  at  night.  The 
German  Fleet  was."  To  this  should  be  added  the 
statement  that  the  British  fleet  was  not  prepared 

1  "Jellicoe  was  sending  out  radio  instructions  at  the  rate  of 
two  a  minute  —  while  von  Scheer  made  only  nine  such  signals  dur- 
ing the  whole  battle.  This  I  learn  on  credible  testimony."  Rear 
Admiral  Caspar  F.  Goodrich,  U.S.N. 


52          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

in  methods  in  advance  to  cope  with  the  conditions 
of  the  afternoon  of  May  31.  The  German  fleet 
was.  Herein  lay  the  chief  cause  for  failure  to  gain 
a  decision,  when  the  one  great  opportunity  of  the 
war  was  offered  to  the  British  fleet. 

In  the  three  decades  before  The  World  War  great 
strides  had  been  made  in  naval  development,  with 
only  the  unequal  fighting  in  the  American  War 
with  Spain  and  in  the  East  to  give  the  tests  of 
warfare.  In  this  period  it  is  probable  that  at 
different  times  first  one  navy  would  be  in  the  lead 
and  then  another.  It  was  the  misfortune  of  the 
British  in  the  Battle  of  Jutland  that  the  Germans, 
at  that  time,  were  better  prepared  in  equipment 
and  rehearsed  methods  for  an  action  under  the 
existing  conditions.  This  should  be  recognized  as 
an  important  factor  —  and  the  failure  to  win  a 
decision  should  not  be  wholly  charged  against  the 
men  who  fought  the  battle. 

The  destroyer  came  to  its  own  in  the  Battle  of 
Jutland  as  an  auxiliary  of  the  battle  fleet,  both  for 
offense  and  defense.  The  whole  course  of  the 
action  proved  that  a  screen  of  destroyers  was  abso- 
lutely necessary.  For  offense,  it  might  be  argued 
truthfully  that,  of  the  great  number  of  torpedoes 
used,  very  few  hit  anything.  The  Marlborough 
was  the  only  capital  ship  reported  struck  in  the 


THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND          53 

real  action,1  and  she  was  able  afterward  to  take 
some  part  in  the  battle,  and  then  get  back  to  her 
base.  But  above  all  things  stands  out  the  fact 
that  it  was  the  threat  of  night  torpedo  attacks  by 
German  destroyers,  and  the  desire  to  safeguard 
the  British  capital  ships  from  these  torpedo  at- 
tacks, which  made  the  British  fleet  withdraw  from 
the  battlefield,  and  break  off  touch  with  the  Ger- 
man fleet.  Lord  Jellicoe  states  that  he  "rejected 
at  once  the  idea  of  a  night  action"  on  account  of 
"first  the  presence  of  torpedo  craft  in  such  large 
numbers."  (J) 

There  is  no  question  of  the  fact  that  this  with- 
drawal of  the  British  fleet  had  a  great  moral  effect 
on  Germany.  Morale  was  all-important  in  The 
World  War,  and  the  announcement  to  the  people 
and  to  the  Reichstag  had  a  heartening  effect  on 
the  Germans  at  just  the  time  they  needed  some 
such  stimulant,  with  an  unfavorable  military  situa- 
tion for  the  Central  Powers.  It  also  smoothed 
over  the  irritation  of  the  German  people  against 
the  German  Navy,  at  this  time  when  Germany 
had  been  obliged  to  modify  her  use  of  the  U-boats 
upon  the  demand  of  the  United  States.  For 
months  after  the  battle  the  esteem  of  the  German 

1  The  Pommern  was  sunk  in  the  night  after  the  action  of  fleets 
had  been  broken  off. 


£4          THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

people  for  the  German  Navy  remained  high,  and 
this  helped  to  strengthen  the  German  Govern- 
ment. But  the  actual  tactical  result  of  the  battle 
was  indecisive.  It  may  be  said  that  the  Germans 
had  so  manoeuvred  their  fleet  that  a  detached 
part  of  the  superior  British  force  was  cut  up,  but 
the  damage  was  not  enough  to  impair  the  estab- 
lished superiority  of  the  British  fleet. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  Battle  of  Jutland  did  not 
have  any  actual  effect  upon  the  situation  on  the 
seas.  The  British  fleet  still  controlled  the  North 
Sea.  The  Entente  Allies  were  still  able  to  move 
their  troops  and  supplies  over  water-ways  which 
were  barred  to  the  Germans.  Not  a  German  ship 
was  released  from  port,  and  there  was  no  effect 
upon  the  blockade.  After  Jutland,  as  before,  the 
German  fleet  could  not  impose  its  power  upon 
the  seas,  and  it  could  not  make  any  effort  to  end 
the  blockade.  The  Jutland  action  had  cheered  the 
German  people  but  it  had  not  given  to  Germany 
a  fragment  of  sea  power. 


CHART  NO.  2 
THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND 

(This  chart  is  diagrammatic  only) 

Most  of  the  published  narratives  have  used  many  charts  to  trace  the  events  of  the  ac- 
tion. It  has  been  found  possible  to  indicate  all  the  essentials  upon  this  one  chart,  which 
has  been  so  placed  that  it  can  be  opened  outside  the  pages  for  use  as  the  text  is  being 
read.  It  should  be  noted  that  superimposed  indications  have  been  avoided,  where  ships 
passed  over  the  same  areas  (especially  in  the  three  German  ships-right-about  manoeu- 
vres;. Consequently  thig  chart  is  diagrammatic  only. 

I.  BATTLE  CRUISER  ACTION 

©   3.30  P.M.  Beatty  sights  Hipper. 

@  3.48  P.M.  Battle  cruisers  engage  at  18,500  yds.,  "both 
forces  opening  fire  practically  simultaneously." 

®   4.06  P.M.  Indefatigable  sunk. 

0  4.42  P.M.  Beatty  sights  High  Seas  Fleet,  and  turns 
north  (column  right  about). 

®  4.57  P.M.  Evan-Thomas  turns  north,  covering  Beatty. 

®  5.35  P.M.  Beatty's  force,  pursued  by  German  battle 
cruisers  and  High  Seas  Fleet,  on  northerly  course  at  long  range. 

II.   MAIN  ENGAGEMENT 

©  5.56  P.M.  Beatty  sights  Jellicoe  and  shifts  to  easterly 
course  at  utmost  speed. 

®  6.20-7.00  P.M.  Jellicoe  deploys  on  port  wing  column 
(deployment  "complete"  at  6.38).  Beatty  takes  position 
ahead  of  Grand  Fleet.  Hood  takes  station  ahead  of  Beatty. 
Evan-Thomas  falls  in  astern  of  Grand  Fleet. 

Scheer  turns  whole  German  Fleet  to  west  (ships  right  about) 
at  6.35,  covered  by  smoke  screens.  Scheer  repeats  the  turn  of 
the  whole  fleet  (ships  right  about)  to  east  at  6.55. 

®  7.17  P.M.  Scheer  for  the  third  time  makes  "swing- 
around"  of  whole  German  Fleet  (ships  right  about)  to  south- 
west, under  cover  of  smoke  screens  and  destroyer  attacks.  Jel- 
licoe turns  away  to  avoid  torpedoes  (7.23). 

®   8.00  P.M. 

©   8.30-9.00  P.M.  Jellicoe  disposes  for  the  night. 


BATTLtCRUIStRS  OPtN  FIRt 
SIMULTANEOUSLY  183OOYOV  3.-»8 


BATTLE.  OF  JUTLAND 


I  BATTLE CRUISC.R  ACTION 

350-5.50 

DEATTY 

EVAN-THOMAS 

HIPPER 

SCHEER 


C.VAM-TXOMA5 
TURNS  NORTH 
,  4-37 


fctATTY  SIOMT3 
MiGH  &EA»FLCtT  AND  ( 
TURNS  NORTH 


SCMtB-R. 
MIOM  atAS FLEET' 


From  /<  C'uirfe  (o  the  Military  Hutory  of  The  World  War,  1914-1918. 


GRAND  FLEtT 
DEPLOYS   ON  PORT 
WING     6.  JO 


J.'-oe.rtNse.,  BLACK 

PRINCt,  AND  WARRIOR 
POT  OUTO*  ACTION 
6.20 


JELLICOt 

SHIFTS 
COURSk 
BY  SUB- 
DIVISIONS 
TO  AVOID 
TOKCEP1U. 


II  MAIN  ENGAGEMENT. 

5.5  O-  9.00 


AT  9.00  JtLLICOt  TAKES   iOUTHtRLY 
COURSE.  TOK  TH  t  N  lOMT 


V 


WZSTCOTT 


McGRATH-SHBRRILL    PRESS 
GRAPHIC   ARTS    BLDG. 
BOSTON 


UNiV  OF  CALIF  UwmthY,  LO*  r*«.*~.i.~w 


